A file on the SIMTEL20 archives, PD:

 Statement in Support of Communications Privacy

Tue, 18 Jun 91 22:27:11 -0700
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, and RSA Data Security Inc. cosponsored a meeting of
cryptographers, civil libertarians, business leaders, and people from
all over the government who handle cryptography and privacy issues.
The following statement was released at the meeting.

    STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY
            Washington, DC
             June 10, 1991

    As representatives of leading computer and telecommunications
companies, as members of national privacy and civil liberties organizations, as
academics and researchers across the country, as computer users, as corporate
users of computer networks, and as individuals interested in the protection of
privacy and the promotion of liberty, we have joined together for the purpose
of recommending that the United States government undertake a new approach to
support communications privacy and to promote the availability of
privacy-enhancing technologies.  We believe that our effort will strengthen
economic competitiveness, encourage technological innovation, and ensure that
communications privacy will be carried forward into the next decade.

    In the past several months we have become aware that the federal
government has failed to take advantage of opportunities to promote
communications privacy.  In some areas, it has considered proposals that would
actually be a step backward.  The area of cryptography is a prime example.

    Cryptography is the process of translating a communication into a code
so that it can be understood only by the person who prepares the message and
the person who is intended to receive the message.  In the communications
world, it is the technological equivalent of the seal on an envelope.  In the
security world, it is like a lock on a door.  Cryptography also helps to ensure
the authenticity of messages and promotes new forms of business in electronic
environments.  Cryptography makes possible the secure exchange of information
through complex computer networks, and helps to prevent fraud and industrial
espionage.

    For many years, the United States has sought to restrict the use of
encryption technology, expressing concern that such restrictions were necessary
for national security purposes.  For the most part, computer systems were used
by large organizations and military contractors.  Computer policy was largely
determined by the Department of Defense.  Companies that tried to develop new
encryption products confronted export control licensing, funding restrictions,
and classification review.  Little attention was paid to the importance of
communications privacy for the general public.

    It is clear that our national needs are changing.  Computers are
ubiquitous.  We also rely on communication networks to exchange messages daily.
The national telephone system is in fact a large computer network.

    We have opportunities to reconsider and redirect our current policy on
cryptography.  Regrettably, our government has failed to move thus far in a
direction that would make the benefits of cryptography available to a wider
public.

    In late May, representatives of the State Department met in Europe with
the leaders of the Committee for Multilateral Export Controls ("COCOM").  At
the urging of the National Security Agency, our delegates blocked efforts to
relax restrictions on cryptography and telecommunications technology, despite
dramatic changes in Eastern Europe.  Instead of focusing on specific national
security needs, our delegates continued a blanket opposition to secure network
communication technologies.

    While the State Department opposed efforts to promote technology
overseas, the Department of Justice sought to restrict its use in the United
States. A proposal was put forward by the Justice Department that would require
telecommunications providers and manufacturers to redesign their services and
products with weakened security.  In effect, the proposal would have made
communications networks less well protected so that the government could obtain
access to all telephone communications.  A Senate Committee Task Force Report
on Privacy and Technology established by Senator Patrick Leahy noted that this
proposal could undermine communications privacy.

    The public opposition to S. 266 was far-reaching.  Many individuals
wrote to Senator Biden and expressed their concern that cryptographic equipment
and standards should not be designed to include a "trapdoor" to facilitate
government eavesdropping.  Designing in such trapdoors, they noted, is no more
appropriate than giving the government the combination to every safe and a
master key to every lock.

    We are pleased that the provision in S. 266 regarding government
surveillance was withdrawn.  We look forward to Senator Leahy's hearing on
cryptography and communications privacy later this year.  At the same time, we
are aware that proposals like S. 266 may reemerge and that we will need to
continue to oppose such efforts.  We also hope that the export control issue
will be revisited and the State Department will take advantage of the recent
changes in East-West relations and relax the restrictions on cryptography and
network communications technology.

    We believe that the government should promote communications privacy.
We therefore recommend that the following steps be taken.

    First, proposals regarding cryptography should be moved beyond the
domain of the intelligence and national security community.  Today, we are
growing increasingly dependent on computer communications.  Policies regarding
the appropriate use of cryptography should be subject to public review and
public debate.

    Second, any proposal to facilitate government eavesdropping should be
critically reviewed.  Asking manufacturers and service providers to make their
services less secure will ultimately undermine efforts to strengthen
communications privacy across the country.  While these proposals may be based
on sound concerns, there are less invasive ways to pursue legitimate government
goals.

    Third, government agencies with appropriate expertise should work free
of NSA influence to promote the availability of cryptography so as to ensure
communications privacy for the general public.  The National Academy of Science
has recently completed two important studies on export controls and computer
security.  The Academy should now undertake a study specifically on the use of
cryptography and communications privacy, and should also evaluate current
obstacles to the widespread adoption of cryptographic protection.

    Fourth, the export control restrictions for computer network technology
and cryptography should be substantially relaxed.  The cost of export control
restrictions are enormous.  Moreover, foreign companies are often able to
obtain these products from other sources. And one result of export restrictions
is that US manufacturers are less likely to develop privacy-protecting products
for the domestic market.

    As our country becomes increasingly dependent on computer
communications for all forms of business and personal communication, the need
to ensure the privacy and security of these messages that travel along the
networks grows.  Cryptography is the most important technological safeguard for
ensuring privacy and security.  We believe that the general public should be
able to make use of this technology free of government restrictions.

    There is a great opportunity today for the United States to play a
leadership role in promoting communications privacy.  We hope to begin this
process by this call for a reevaluation of our national interest in
cryptography and privacy.

Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation
Marc Rotenberg, CPSR
John Gilmore, EFF
D. James Bidzos, RSA
Phil Karn, BellCore
Ron Rivest, MIT
Jerry Berman, ACLU
Whitfield Diffie, Northern Telecom
David Peyton, ADAPSO
Ronald Plesser, Information Industry Association
Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University
David Kahn, author *The Codebreakers*
Ray Ozzie, IRIS Associates
Evan D. Hendricks, US Privacy Council
Priscella M. Regan, George Mason University
Lance J. Hoffman, George Washington University
David Bellin, Pratt University
     (affiliations are for identification purposes only)



 NIST announces public-key digital signature standard

Thu, 27 Jun 91 11:39:59 -0700
    Statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Director
    National Institute of Standards and Technology
    Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness
    of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
    On Computer Security Implementation
    House of Representatives,   June 27, 1991

Digital Signature Standard

I know that you are interested in our progress in developing a federal digital
signature standard based upon the principles of public-key cryptography.  I am
pleased to tell you that we are working out the final arrangements on the
planned standard, and hope to announce later this summer our selection of a
digital signature standard based on a variant of the ElGamal signature
technique.

Our efforts in this area have been slow, difficult, and complex.  We evaluated
a number of alternative digital signature techniques, and considered a variety
of factors in this review: the level of security provided, the ease of
implementation in both hardware and software, the ease of export from the U.S.,
the applicatility of patents and the level of efficiency in both the signature
and verification functions that the technique performs.

In selecting digital signature technique method [sic], we followed the mandate
contained in section 2 of the Computer Security Act of 1987 to develop
standards and guidelines that ". . . assure the cost-effective security and
privacy of sensisive information in Federal systems."  We placed primary
emphasis on selecting the technology that best assures the appropriate security
of Federal information.  We were also concerned with selecting the technique
with the most desirable operating and use characteristics.

In terms of operating characteristics, the digital signature technique provides
for a less computational-intensive signing function than verification function.
This matches up well with anticipated Federal uses of the standard.  The
signing function is expected to be performed in a relatively computationally
modest environment such as with smart cards.  The verification process,
however, is expected to be implemented in a computationally rich environmnet
such as on mainframe systems or super-minicomputers.

With respect to use characteristics, the digital signature technique is
expected to be available on a royalty-free basis in the public interest
world-wide.  This should result in broader use by both government and the
private sector, and bring economic benefits to both sectors.

A few details related to the selection of this technique remain to be worked
out.  The government is applying to the U.S. Patent Office for a patent, and
will also seek foreign protection as appropriate.  As I stated, we intend to
make the technique available world-wide on a royalty-free basis in the public
interest.

A hashing function has not been specified by NIST for use with the digital
signature standard.  NIST has been reviewing various candidate hashing
functions; however, we are not satisfied with any of the functions we have
studied thus far.  We will provide a hashing function that is complementary to
the standard.

I want to speak to two issues that have been raised in the public debate over
digital signature techniques.  One is the allegation that a "trap door", a
method for the surreptitious defeat of the security of this system, has been
built into the technique that we are selecting.  I state categorically that no
trap door has been designed into this standard nor does the U.S. Government
know of any which is inherent in the ElGamal signature method that is the
foundation of our technique.

Another issue raised is the lack of public key exchange capabilities.  I
believe that, to avoid capricious activity, Public Key Exchange under control
of a certifying authority is required for government applications.  The details
of such a process will be developed for government/industry use.

NIST/NSA Technical Working Group

Aspects of digital signature standard were discussed by the NIST/NSA Technical
Working Group, established under the NIST/NSA Memorandum of Understanding. The
Working Group also discussed issues involving the applicability of the digital
signature algorithm to the classified community, cryptographic key management
techniques, and the hashing function to be used in conjunction with the digital
signature standard.  Progress on these items has taken place; however, as with
the digital signature standard, non-technical issues such as patents and
exportability require examination, and this can be a lengthy process.  We have
found that working with NSA is productive.  The Technical Working Group
provides an essential mechanism by which NIST and NSA can conduct the technical
discussions and exchange contemplated by the Computer Security Act and also
allows us to address important issues drawing upon NSA's expertise.



 Re: Videotape of the pilot discussing the crash of UAL 232
Robert Dorsett 
Sat, 29 Jun 91 00:28:11 CDT
>There's been a lot of discussion of the safety of fly-by-wire aircraft, so
>here's the discussion of an accident that very possibly would have been
>prevented were the DC-10 fly-by-wire rather than hydraulic.

As I'm sure Mary realizes, FBW does not alleviate the necessity for multiple-
redundant hydraulics, and all the plumbing that comes with them.  As currently
implemented on most aircraft, it simply replaces the means by which the
*hydraulic* actuators are operated.  Instead of cables, there are electrical
wires.  These leads to one or more computers, which in turn process command
inputs from the pilot, leading to the possibility of unconventional control
laws.  Most of the controversy of FBW occurs at this stage.  The severity of
the failure involved would have happened whether the DC-10 were FBW or not.

Now, in rebuttal, I'm sure Mary'd point out that the FBW issue would only
enter in the form of *control* issues subsequent to the accident, introducing
unconventional control laws to effectively duplicate (or improve upon) the
differential thrust technique Haynes used.  And she has a point.  But there's
always the question of whether the complexity and cost of such software will
ever justify its usefulness in the "1:1e-9" catastrophic control failure
case.  In safety management, there is a point of negative return.

Perhaps a more salient observation would have been: this accident would not
have happened if there was full manual reversion on the DC-10, ala the Boeing
707? :-)

Robert Dorsett Internet: rdd@cactus.org UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!cactus.org!rdd




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